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Knight of Malta Leonard Leo behind the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court

https://farnesius.wordpress.com/2020/10/15/knight-of-malta-leonard-leo-behind-the-nomination-of-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supreme-court/
The man behind the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) is Leonard Leo.
“In nominating Amy Barrett to the Supreme Court, President Donald Trump has again fulfilled his promise to appoint Justices who are not only exceptionally qualified, but willing to bravely stand up for the Constitution as it’s written and not bend to political pressures or personal preferences,” said the conservative Federalist Society’s Leonard Leo, who has advised Trump on judicial appointments.
https://www.dailyherald.com/news/20200926/trump-picks-conservative-amy-coney-barrett-for-supreme-court
Leo is a devout Roman Catholic, like Barrett herself, a Knight of Malta, and an active member of various Catholic organizations;
Leonard Leo is a champion of global religious liberty, having served as chairman of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) as well as delegate to the UN Council and UN Commission on Human Rights. In the U.S., he promotes civil liberties as executive vice president of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies. Leo is also an active leader in Catholic organizations, serving on the boards of the Catholic Information Center, Catholic University of America, and the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He is a founding board member of the National Catholic Prayer Breakfast and a member of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta.
https://acton.org/event/2017/05/11/leonard-leo
Leo was also behind the selection of Trump’s earlier nominations Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, who are both Jesuit trained, and before that, the nominations of John Roberts, a devout Roman Catholic and Georgetown University faculty member, and Samuel Alito, a Knight of Columbus;
If all goes according to plan, Leonard Leo will be able to take credit for something no president has accomplished for decades: installing four Supreme Court justices. Both of President Donald Trump’s nominees come directly from a list Leo compiled. They join John Roberts and Samuel Alito, also shepherded by Leo, and dozens of lower court federal judges across the country. As executive vice president of the Federalist Society, Leo has been the quiet architect of a pivotal shift to the right throughout the federal judiciary.”
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2018/politico50/leonard-leo/
Barrett, People of Praise, ecumenism, and the Jesuits
Barrett is a member of People of Praise, which is a charismatic ecumenical Christian movement. Take note that “ecumenism” is really just a codeword for Catholicizing protestant churches, i.e., bring them back under the auspices of the Papacy.
The ecumenical movement was created by the Jesuits as a part of the still continuing counter-reformation, as was the charismatic movement. Both of these movements are tools for the Jesuits to infiltrate and subvert protestant churches, and you can see how well they have worked, protestant Christianity having for the most part become lukewarm and/or “bosom pals” of the Pope.
Pentecostal bishop Tony Palmer) (1966-2014) preaches that the “protest is over” and that “we’re all Catholics again”, and then shows a greeting and message of “unity” from his friend Jesuit Pope Francis:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uA4EPOfic5A
https://amazingdiscoveries.org/is-the-protest-over
And, with all that said;
As has been widely reported, the People of Praise uses the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola as a basis for counsel and discernment. Burning with Love for God: A Guide to the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, written by People of Praise members Paul DeCelles and Mary Frances Sparrow and published in 2016, was recently reviewed in the Journal of Jesuit Studies by Francis X. McAloon, S.J.
https://peopleofpraise.org/news/?p=8216
The Jesuit Catholic dominated SCOTUS
If Amy Coney Barrett gets appointed to the SCOTUS, it will have six Catholic justices: Chief Justice John Roberts, a Jesuit Georgetown University faculty member; Clarence Thomas, a Jesuit College of the Holy Cross graduate; Samuel Alito, a Knight of Columbus; Sonia Sotomayor, a former associate of Jesuit priest Joseph A. O’Hare; Brett Kavanaugh, a Jesuit Georgetown Preparatory School graduate; and Barrett.
Neil Gorsuch is nominally a protestant, but he graduated from the Georgetown Prep like Kavanaugh, and they incidentally even attended the school at the same time.
The remaining two Justices are Jewish: Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer. Worth noting is also that the husband of Jewish Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who Barrett would replace, Martin D. Ginsburg, was a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. Yet another obvious Jesuit connection. You think all this is just a coincidence?
Thomas Richards on the Red Mass and the Vatican control of the Supreme Court:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3edVd6-SJgs
submitted by farnesius to Jesuitworldorder

The case for the shortened graphite displacers effect not existing in 1975 - Alexander Nikolaevich Rumyantsev

The case for the shortened graphite displacers effect not existing in 1975 - Alexander Nikolaevich Rumyantsev
Let's take a detour from the reports and revisit a titillating topic. It can be summarized as so from a ProAtom (Russian publication/information agency) 2016 article titled Chernobyl: tragedy, farce and lesson:
In the period 1976-1978. In order to save concrete by reducing the height of the under-reactor space, both the Chief Designer (NIKIET) and the Scientific Supervisor (I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy) made a joint decision to shorten the graphite displacers on the control rods with the formation of 1.2 m high water columns under them.
...
The design decision to save concrete by reducing the height of the sub-reactor space by 2 meters with subsequent shortening of the displacers of the control rods, under which water columns 1.2 meters high were formed, turned out to be fatal for the RBMK reactors. Three years before the Chernobyl accident, direct experiments showed the danger of such a decision.
...
The main conclusion was and remains that it was precisely the shortening of the graphite displacers on the control rods that predetermined the unprecedented scale of the Chernobyl accident. Without shortening the displacers on the control rods, the scale of the accident would be commensurate with the accident at Unit 1 of the Leningrad NPP in December 1975, which is no longer remembered today.
A lot more context is provided by another ProAtom article published five years earlier written by the same author, for which I would appreciate the direct source as this one seems to be missing some lines:
Ignorance or ignorance of the revealed competition of two spatial effects in subsequent (without my participation) improvements to RBMK-type reactors led to the fact that graphite displacers (end switches) on the control rods and AZ. Instead of graphite, at the bottom of these rods, there were columns of water about 1.2 meters high. These pillars played the role of an absorber of thermal neutrons and their size was quite correlated with the abovementioned effective diameter of the local criticality zone (2.5-3 meters). When the core rods were dropped in the lower part of the core, water was displaced by graphite ends of the core rods, which brought additional positive reactivity to the already existing positive vapor effect of reactivity and the effect of “squeezing” the neutron field down. The predicted effect of the increase in the volumetric coefficient of non-uniformity of energy release during the release of the core at low power levels with the possibility of creating local zones of supercriticality was in the early 80s. of the last century was experimentally confirmed during the start-up of reactors both at the Chernobyl NPP and at the Ignalina NPP with the RBMK-1500 reactor. In 1986, this effect was again experimentally confirmed by the accident at the 4th unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which happened on my birthday on April 26.
...
In the course of work on the development of the computing base of the I.A. IV Kurchatov managed to learn about the improvements in RBMK-1000, introduced at the Chernobyl NPP. The greatest interest was aroused by the decision to shorten the graphite displacers on the control rods and cores. Attempts to find out from the persons who were then already Laureates of the State Prize for the RBMK reactor, the measure of the validity of such improvements did not lead to anything. It only remained to wait. E.P. Kunegin, who served as the deputy scientific supervisor of the RBMK project, passed away in 1983. V.A.Sidorenko was transferred to work at Gosatomnadzor. A.P. Aleksandrov became the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The actual management of the reactor directions was transferred to the Deputy Director of the Institute V.A.Legasov, a talented chemist.
...
At an expanded meeting of the party and economic activists of the I.A. I.V.Kurchatov on November 13, 1984, led by A.Yu. Gagarinsky, just elected secretary of the Party Committee of the Institute, on behalf of OVTiR (OVTiR director I.I.Malashinin, as usual, urgently “fell ill” - “lay down on bottom ”), a program for the development of the Institute's computing base for the future 10-15 years was outlined in the framework of the implementation of the Resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. The program was developed together with IN Polyakov, then Deputy Director of OVTiR, future director of the RRC “Kurchatov Institute” (2003-2006), with the most active participation of the Chairman of the Council of Computer Users LV Mayorov and members of the Council. When presenting the program, it was emphasized that the lack of computing power does not allow for the necessary analysis of the safety of the design decisions for NPPs, and that the most likely candidate for a severe accident is the newest RBMK units with all their improvements. LV Mayorov stressed the acute shortage of computing power and the risk of incomplete reactor designs. In the first row of the conference hall, bld. 158 were sitting A.P. Aleksandrov and V.A.Legasov. V.A.Legasov reacted violently to what he heard, turning to personal insults at L.V. Mayorov. A.P. Aleksandrov was mostly silent, but he took this information so close to his heart that three days later he raised the issue of abolishing OVTiR, which was done. [lol, I just got what he was writing here and in the following sentences] At the same meeting, the Chief Engineer of the I.A. IVKurchatova EOAdamov (the future head of Minatom) made a proposal to build a garage and automated mechanical workshops instead of a computer center within the framework of his developed program of engineering reconstruction of the Institute. As a result, the proposal of E.O. Adamov was implemented. The decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers was ignored without consequences. The garage was built and stood empty for over 10 years until it was “handed over” to the car company Audi. The mechanical workshops, declared the “All-Union Shock Komsomol Construction Project,” are still unfinished. The only person who unequivocally assessed what had happened at this party and economic asset was N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, who, after the end of the asset, told me that the Exhibition and Convention Center would be built. Despite all the difficulties, the building for the Exhibition and Convention Center was built 12 years later within the framework of the program for the creation of space reactor facilities solely thanks to the initiative and support from N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy. The design assignment for this structure was written by I.N. Polyakov and myself. This building with all its structures turned out to be extremely suitable for the deployment of work on microelectronics and, then, for the deployment of multiprocessor computing systems in it. Tape tapes with the recording of speeches and discussions at this extended meeting of the party and economic activists disappeared from the archives of the Party Committee in May-June 1986 after the accident at the 4th block of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
Information about the accident at the 4th unit of the ChNPP was received from A.Yu. Gagarinsky on April 28, 1986 without any details. In terms of details, he, the secretary of the Party Committee, publicly advised to listen to the Voice of America radio station. A week later, as the leader of the political and economic seminar of the OVT, I held a scheduled seminar. On it, A.A. Derbenev, who knew well the history of my work on RBMK, asked about the possible causes of this accident. Not knowing any details of what happened, except for the official reports of the accident, I put forward a number of versions, the main one of which was the unevenness of energy release provoked by low power operation, which initiated the formation of local supercriticality zones in the lower part of the core near the side reflector with subsequent acceleration (see details higher). Later it turned out that it was so. In June 1986 g. A.Ya. Kramerov, the head of the RBMK Laboratory, who returned from a business trip to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, met me in the dining room of the Institute and asked the same question. And I got the same answer, which was very surprised.
In May 1986, during a personal meeting with V.A.Legasov, who had returned from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, I asked to be included in the team of the Institute, which was engaged in analyzing the causes of the accident. He promised to do it. Two years later, after the death of V.A.Legasov, we managed to find out that he gave the command not to allow me to analyze this accident for a “cannon” shot. The reasons for this decision are not known to me.
...
However, a little lower in the same report there is a phrase (quoted from [1], Section 5 “Priority measures to improve the safety of NPPs with RBMK reactors”): “It was decided to rearrange the limit switches of control rods at operating NPPs with RBMK reactors so that in the extreme position, all the rods were immersed in the core to a depth of 1.2 m. This measure increases the speed efficiency of protection and eliminates the possibility of increasing the multiplying properties of the core in its lower part ( highlighted by me, AHR ) when the rod moves from the upper limit switch. "
The highlighted fragment of the text was intended to disguise the true cause of such a large-scale accident associated with the shortening of the graphite displacers “control rods” by 1.2 meters as part of the work on the improvement of RBMK-1000 reactors carried out by the Chief Designer with the participation of the Scientific Supervisor, who ignored the already known features of neutron physics and thermal hydraulics in the lower part of the core when the reactor is operating at low power. I believe that without shortening the graphite displacers, any manipulations by the Chernobyl NPP personnel could only lead to a repetition of the accident that occurred at Unit 1 of the Leningrad NPP in December 1975. Maybe on a somewhat larger scale. For this they could be punished. As far as I know, none of the personnel of Unit 1 of the Leningrad NPP was brought to trial for the accident in December 1975.
This is a lot to take in but it's actually an introduction that will eventually tie into Politburo meeting remarks. First things first, I had previously combined this Alexander Nikolaevich Rumyantsev with Alexander) Yuryevich Rumyantsev into one person, who graduated from the same place and ended up at the same place but is in fact two different people. This is not The Revenge of the Atomic Czar.
What is the significance of it? In one word - humiliation. The central claim doesn't really change accountability for the incident - whether the positive scram effect, or more specifically the water columns under the graphite displacers effect, existed from the beginning of these large RBMK commercial reactors or since a later "improvement" makes little difference to the failure to appreciate its potential significance and implement any sort of rational solution. But trying to save concrete, which in terms of availability in the Soviet Union may have been comparable to bread, resulting in this,
The direct and indirect damage from the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant many times exceeded all investments in the nuclear energy of the USSR and, in fact, having initiated an economic catastrophe in the context of low world oil prices, led to the disappearance of the USSR.
a notion the USSR's leader Mikhail Gorbachev also presently seems to subscribe to, is downright ironic. Of course if such a thing had come to light in the aftermath of Chernobyl the furor and consternation would have been a sight to behold, most horrifyingly for those directly responsible who also had the demonstrable advantage of inside knowledge and expertise they used to deceive, as best they could, even (or especially) their government. To quote Politburo June 5 1986 Gorbachev:
About Chernobyl. We should make every agency individually responsible (for dealing with the consequences). Because the effect of getting used to it is already kicking in. And they will be held to strict account. In this case, we are responsible to our people, responsible to the entire world. And let's put an end to the bureaucratic parochialism. One hears all the time: I am in charge of my own objective there. Everybody is in charge of their own objective, it turns out. No, the objective is the same for everybody--Chernobyl! But comrades are incapable of looking beyond the lines of their particular work responsibilities. Chernobyl is everybody's business: of all the ministers, and all the members of the Central Committee, and the entire CC apparatus.
The social aspect is extremely important. We have to have very strict oversight here. We must determine all the social parameters of the consequences before July. I am very concerned about the work of the government commission, which is investigating the causes of the catastrophe. We will raise this issue very strictly and very extensively at the Politburo, and we will not allow them to manipulate us with all kinds of professional conclusions, which are actually just excuses.
It is quite obvious--lack of responsibility, dissoluteness. Nobody should count on mercy. A repetition of anything like this should be absolutely excluded. One or two accidents like this and we would get it worse than from a total nuclear war. Already now you see the resonance and the kind of expense! The loss of production by now is already at one billion eight hundred million rubles. And the expenditures for the object itself are at about two billion rubles. In a word, we are talking about very serious things.
Addresses Shcherbina (Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers): Be at your best. We are talking about life itself. You must prepare a very serious party-state document (about the causes and consequences). We should not shy away from anything. Now, trying to present it as an easy task would be the worst thing.
Alexander Nikolaevich Rumyantsev is the key to this for as far as we know he's the only one who has made the claim that the graphite displacers were intentionally shortened at an intermediate point. INSAG-7 states they were always the same size. The 2009/2011 article he wrote gives a substantial amount of background, granted he is the author of it.
Alexander Nikolaevich Rumyantsev was educated at MEPhI. Until 1965, he worked at NIKIET as a design engineer, mastering the computer technology that was new at that time, and conducting massive neutron-physical calculations. In 1966 he went to work at the IAE [Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy], where he participated in the development of an alternative design for the RBMK-1000 reactor, as an independent control over the developers of the main project. Along the way, work continued on mastering new advanced computing technology, creating programs and carrying out three-dimensional neutron-physical and thermal-hydraulic calculations. In 1974, the competitive activity on the RBMK-1000 project was terminated, and A.N. Rumyantsev went to work at the IAEA. Upon his return to the IAE in 1981, he held the position of Deputy Director of OVTiR (Department of Computer Technology and Radioelectronics). Below are the memoirs of AN Rumyantsev, inspired by the next anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, and published by the information agency PROatom [21/02/2011] . These lengthy recollections are valuable because they describe the initial stage of the development of the RBMK-1000 project (1965-1975), which predetermined the choice of the main parameters of the physics and design of the reactor, and was forever buried under the Chernobyl accident.
This accidont.ru description of who Rumyantsev was isn't very accurate but it pulls out some of the basics. Rumyantsev was educated at perhaps the top Soviet university for nuclear research, then proceeded to work at the Chief [Designe]Design Engineer (NIKIET), the Scientific SupervisoManager (Kurchatov Institute/IAE), and the International Atomic Energy Agency. In other words, this guy was where the action happened and privy to things that operators and other commentators weren't.
Immediately after graduating from MEPhI in 1963 with a degree in engineer-physicist, I was sent to work as a design engineer in the organization P. Ya. 788, now - Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET) named after N.A. Dollezhal. Starting in August 1963, work in the group of Yu.I. Mityaev, which was part of the Physics Department No. 5, headed by A.D.Zhirnov, two months later I received a temporary pass at the I.A.E. IV Kurchatov for the purpose of using the computer equipment available in it (M-20 type computers) to carry out work in the field of computational modeling of the characteristics of channel reactors with direct steam superheating installed and constructed at the Beloyarsk NPP (AMB type reactors). NIKIET did not have the necessary computing base.
So as soon as he graduates from university Rumyantsev goes to work at the organization/institute that seems to have split primary responsibility for RBMK reactors with the Kurchatov Institute in the lead-up to the Chernobyl explosion. You see repeated mentions in INSAG-7 and other sources of the Chief Design Engineer and the Scientific Manager (with slight variations) in tandem as the two top supervisors and decision makers. The RBMK reactors may have been under the Ministry of Energy but they seem to have been more so used by the Ministry of Energy rather than totally controlled by it. Midnight in Chernobyl by Adam Higginbotham describes how in the aftermath of the incident the Ministry of Energy was pointing to design flaws whereas the high profile experts from the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which may have spawned NIKIET and the Kurchatov Institute, and the Kurchatov Institute (NIKIET must have been involved too) were blaming operators and various levels of management. The two identified fathers of the RBMK reactor headed NIKIET and the Kurchatov Institute - Nikolai Dollezhal and Anatoly Aleksandrov respectively. The latter was also the president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The third old nuclear titan was at the head of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building whereas the Ministry of Energy was headed by a man Higginbotham describes as "a nuclear neophyte". [p. 267]
Rumyantsev proceeded to quickly obtain a pass to the Kurchatov Institute as NIKIET lacked computing equipment. In about a year, Rumyantsev's translation of calculation methods to computers resulted in a great efficiency boost to a particular presumably non-RBMK but still uranium-graphite reactor type work group. Other NIKIET employees sought to avail themselves of these computers. By the decision of NIKIET director Dollezhal Rumyantsev was entrusted with finding computer time for NIKIET employees and paying for it. Together with two other NIKIET employees Rumyantsev developed "a complex program for calculating the physical characteristics of the cells of the working channels of uranium-graphite reactors taking into account burnout" that served as a working tool for NIKIET until the beginning of the 1970s.
Rumyantsev's "work in the field of physics and thermal hydraulics of uranium-graphite reactors using computers" was noticed by a Kurchatov Institute employee upon whose recommendation Rumyantsev was transferred from NIKIET to the Kurchatov Institute with a promotion from "young specialist" to "senior engineer". The director of NIKIET Dollezhal and his deputy tried to keep Rumyantsev at NIKIET with a carrot and stick approach but off the young specialist turned senior engineer went.
Since the beginning of 1967, S.M. Feinberg completely switched me over to designing channel uranium-graphite reactors with boiling water cooling - RBMK reactors. Almost all theoretical and experimental work on RBMK reactors was concentrated in Sector-15, which was headed by E.P. Kunegin. Sector-15 was mainly responsible for scientific supervision and support of industrial plutonium production reactors. However, S.M. Feinberg, as the deputy scientific director of the RBMK project, considered it necessary to conduct independent design studies in order to be able to make a relatively independent judgment on the work of the RBMK Chief Designer, to whom NIKIET was appointed, the work of Sector-15 and the work of the Chief Designer, who was appointed VNII "Hydroproject". He himself, in fact, acted as an integrator of ideas and approaches,
In 1967 Rumyantsev is switched to work on RBMK design studies in order "to make a relatively independent judgment" on the work of NIKIET/the Chief Design Engineer and the other design organization involved that is mentioned less often. No clue about its role or who headed it, and it doesn't sound like the one mentioned in INSAG-7.
Being an architect by training, figuratively perceiving graphics, S.M. Feinberg loaded me, V.A. Chebotarev and then a very young specialist V.E. Nikulshin, with work on the design of technological channels (TC) for RBMK, requiring the development of sets of assembly drawings equipped with thermohydraulic and neutron-physical characteristics of the reactor, which he used when discussing design solutions proposed by Chief Designer N.A. Dollezhal and his team from NIKIET. Several times S.M. Feinberg took me to these discussions.
Rumyantsev had a first row seat at times to the development of the RBMK reactor.
With the approval of S.M. Feinberg, in the period from the end of 1967 to the end of 1968, for several months I had to be on business trips at the branch of the I.A.E. I.V. Kurchatova - NITI, Sosnovy Bor, next to the construction site of the 1st unit of the Leningrad NPP with the RBMK-1000 reactor. The purpose of the missions was to carry out multiple variant calculations of the RBMK-1000 reactor core with the fullest possible analysis of the influence of the FC design and modes of their operation on the neutronic and thermohydraulic characteristics of the RBMK-1000 reactor. At NITI there was a relatively lightly loaded computer of the M-220 type, on which it was possible to obtain a large (up to 6-12 hours) machine time almost daily. In the IAE them. IV Kurchatov, the possibilities of obtaining computer time were limited to an interval from 15 minutes to 1 hour per day. [at least in the beginning he was working at night]
Then he was sent to conduct more intensive computer work where the first RBMK-1000 reactor would be built.
The results of the performed computational studies were summarized in a number of closed reports of the I.A. I.V. Kurchatov (1968), edited and approved personally by S.M. Feinberg. Not all of the results obtained were included in the reports. From the performed computational studies, it followed that:
...
The general conclusion from the calculations performed was that the choice of a step of 25 cm leads to the appearance of a significant positive vapor effect of reactivity, which may result in the appearance of large and uncontrollable irregularities in the energy release over the reactor volume. But by this time, the main design characteristics of the RBMK-1000 had already been approved and it was no longer possible to change the pitch of the graphite stack. Proposals to reduce the density of graphite to the equivalent of a step of 20-22 cm (“bubble” graphite or filling the masonry with graphite balls) were considered practically unrealizable...
In a number of later works of Sector-15 (1969-71), including those presented at closed seminars, a positive vapor effect of reactivity was also found. But the degree of uncertainty of this effect was considered too large to make immediate decisions on changing the design of the graphite stack, or other elements of the reactor design, or revising the operating modes of the reactor.
Rumyantsev was personally involved in determining that due to design choices a large enough positive void coefficient would appear that may result in spatial irregularities of energy release. This should be the very thing that the Operating Reactivity Margin was meant to control, the lower limit of which was violated routinely, even encouraged and applauded, from the very beginning of RBMK-1000 operation even when that limit was as low as 8 control rods or didn't exist. From the beginning there was a disconnect between design and operation that was never closed, although this issue is not to be confused with the shortened graphite displacers positive scram effect nor with how high the positive void coefficient could go. By this time the main design characteristics were already set, solutions were practically unrealizable, and despite further studies the degree of uncertainty was considered too large to be actionable.
Due to the presence in the NITI and the subsequent appearance in the IAE them. IV Kurchatov, a computer of the BESM-6 type with a record for those times productivity of up to 1 million operations per second, I in the period 1969-1971. a complex of programs for three-dimensional neutron-physical and thermohydraulic calculation of stationary characteristics of channel reactors was developed. The modeling of neutron-physical characteristics was based on the Galanin-Feinberg method developed for three-dimensional geometry. The neutron-physical parameters of each TC [technical channels, these being where the fuel was?], rods of the control and protection system (CPS), additional absorbers (DP) were described by the correlation functions obtained by processing variant calculations of the parameters of the cells of the TC, CPS, DP as a function of burnout, water density, graphite temperature. The thermal-hydraulic calculation was based on the method of channel-by-channel calculation of all (up to 2 thousand) TKs with individual thermohydraulic parameters, including the lengths and other features of the lower supply water and upper outlet steam-water communications (NVK and PVK), which took place in 1969-70. experimental verification at the stand of the Space Station of the I.A. I.V. Kurchatov.
In the late 1960s a more powerful computer seems to have appeared. With computer assisted calculations and modeling being Rumyantsev's area of specialization from the start of his career it seems that again he was at the forefront of availing himself of greater computing capability. The Google translation is unclear as to whether he individually was developing complex programs for calculating characteristics.
The developed software package was used to analyze several critical loads of the UG stand. The calculation results are in satisfactory agreement with the experiment. In the period 1971-1973. Three-dimensional neutron-physical and thermohydraulic calculations of the stationary parameters of RBMK-type reactors were carried out for various power levels and various compositions of cores - from initial start-up to steady-state in the mode of continuous refueling. One calculation took 2-3 hours of processor time on the BESM-6 computer. When carrying out these calculations, it turned out that the applied methods for calculating the effective multiplication factor (Keff) as an eigenvalue of the matrix operator give the maximum first eigenvalue in the form of a negative number in the range 10-12. The mathematically correct solution had no physical meaning. This problem was intensively discussed with V.I. Lebedev and Ya.V. Shevelev. Only the second eigenvalue was found to be positive and in the range of unity, as expected for Keff. Following the formal logic of interpreting the eigenvalues ​​and eigenvectors of matrix operators, it was possible to conclude that initially the most stable state of the reactor core is “its absence”. This was the “first” call regarding the initial safety of future RBMK reactors.
In the early 1970s, as the first Leningrad RBMK-1000 reactor was approaching coming online, the developed software appears to have enabled better analysis of how the reactor would behave in different conditions. "It was possible to conclude that initially the most stable state of the reactor core is “its absence”". I'm not sure how to interpret this comment. Does it bluntly mean that the reactor sucked from a stability standpoint? Rumyantsev marks this as being the first major pivotal point related to the safety of RBMK reactors.
The subsequent analysis of the available information on the problems of eigenvalues ​​and eigenvectors of matrix operators showed that this effect is typical for the so-called. "Loosely coupled systems", i.e. systems consisting of many subsystems that are weakly coupled to each other. It was known from calculations and experiments that a group of 35-40 fresh RBMK type TCs is already forming a critical system. It followed from the calculations that if there are up to 1700 TCs in the core of an RBMK-type reactor, even after equilibrium burnup is reached, a local group of 70-110 TCs can also reach criticality if it does not include DP [additional absorbers] or inserted control rods.
This is more familiar territory. INSAG-7 page 6:
Owing to the largeness of the reactor core (height 7 m, diameter 11.8 m) of the RBMK-1000 reactor, the chain reaction in one part of the core is only very loosely coupled with that in other, distant, regions. This leads to a requirement to control the spatial power distribution almost as if there were several independent reactors within the core volume. This situation in extreme conditions can be highly unstable, because small spatial redistributions of reactivity can cause large spatial redistributions of the power. One manifestation of this decoupling of the core is that just prior to the accident the chain reactions in the upper and lower halves of the reactor were proceeding almost independently, a situation that was exacerbated by heavy xenon poisoning in the intervening central region. When control and safety rods were inserted from fully withdrawn positions under these circumstances, the positive scram effect discussed earlier could cause the lower part of the core to become supercritical and the neutron distribution to shift quickly downwards irrespective of the distribution just prior to rod insertion. Under the conditions of the accident, the shift in power distribution resulting from the positive scram could be substantial.
Pages 83-84:
The causes of the accident have been analysed in many documents and their complexity has been noted. In particular, Ref. [46] presents a concise view of the causes of the accident:
"An analysis of the Chernobyl accident has identified: the major role played by the displacers; the large void reactivity effect; and the formation of extremely large volumetric power density irregularities in the core during the accident. This last fact is one of the most important ones and is caused by the large dimensions of the core (7 m x 12 m), the slow speed of movement of the non-uniform rods (having absorbers, displacers and water columns) (0.4 m/s), and the large void reactivity effect (5/3eff). All these factors predetermined the scale of the Chernobyl accident.
' 'The scale of the Chernobyl accident was therefore not determined by personnel actions, but by a lack of understanding, primarily on the part of the scientific managers, of the effect of steam quality on the reactivity of the RBMK core. This led to an incorrect analysis of the operational safety; to a disregard of repeated manifestations of the large void reactivity effect during operation; to a false confidence in the effectiveness of the RCPS which, in fact, failed to cope with both the Chernobyl accident and many others, in particular with DBAs; and, naturally, to the formulation of incorrect operating procedures.
"This inadequate level of scientific management is explained, above all, by the following:
— the extremely low number of studies of the neutron physics processes taking place in the RBMK core;
— a disregard for discrepancies in the results obtained using different methods;
— the lack of experimental studies under conditions close to the natural ones;
— the lack of analysis of specialized publications; and
— in the long run, the transmission to the Chief Design Engineer of incorrect techniques for calculating the neutron physics processes used to analyse the processes taking place in the core and the safety of plants with RBMK reactors.
' 'It is also an important point that for a long time the USSR Ministry of Power had been operating plants with RBMK reactors with neutron physics instabilities in the core, but did not take sufficient notice of the repeated unusual signals of the emergency power protection system and of the emergency power increase rate protection system following triggering of the EPS, and did not demand thorough investigations of emergency situations.
"...We are bound to conclude that an accident such as that at Chernobyl was inevitable."
Whereas INSAG-7, particularly Annex I, conveys that there was a lack of scientific understanding and research - and there certainly was a disconnect with operation - here is Rumyantsev claiming that he was doing this very sort of research at the Kurchatov Institute.
Let's tie the aforementioned newly released Politburo transcript here:
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At the Politburo Gorbachev is under the impression that theoretical research wasn't continued. Legasov says little, Shcherbina doesn't know what planet he's on. Dollezhal is brought up, as he was in the documents released last year, having misgivings about building these reactors next to populated areas. He is supposed to have been embarrassed in front of foreign press and his concern was dismissed.
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Here Gorbachev gets into it with Meshkov, who's the deputy minister of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Again Gorbachev brings up the point that the RBMK reactor hasn't been studied enough with an unusually reticent Legasov in these documents affirming it. The director of the Kurchatov Institute had claimed to Gorbachev that theoretical studies were halted and not financed, being "sad about what happened".
Guess who was doing this sort of research? Kurchatov Institute employee Alexander Nikolaevich Rumyantsev, and his account conflicts with the "aww, shucks, it's sad more research wasn't done" stance of the leaders of the Kurchatov Institute Anatoly Aleksandrov and Valery Legasov. Go back to the beginning of this post and read about that 1984 meeting the record of which disappeared after the Chernobyl explosion and Legasov's exclusion of Rumyantsev in the investigation.
To be continued. This is an awkward point at which to cut off this post but the character limit is reached. Rumyantsev proceeds to detail further research indicating problems relevant to Chernobyl, and claims to have even been part of developing a solution that was not adopted.
What's the point of all this with respect to the length of the graphite displacers? It's important to establish who Rumyantsev claims he is, what he did, and what he knew. The proximity of his position to the design and science of the reactor exceeds anything I've seen from another singular source. Hell, Legasov likely knew a good deal less than this man. The question is is he actually credible. I want to go through the rest of his article, for which the original source is needed as there are truncated paragraphs, and then go through the three witness accounts of the 1975 Leningrad incident I've seen that in my opinion indicate the witnesses didn't actually know if there was a shortened graphite displacers effect.
submitted by sticks14 to chernobyl

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